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Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion
LEAH L. SCHOLER*
INTRODUCTION
Reverse confusion has not only confused consumers, it has confused
the courts. Since the theory of reverse confusion gained formal recogni-
tion in 1977,' courts have generally found a cause of action for trademark
infringement based on the theory.' Trademark infringement centers on
whether a likelihood of confusion exists as to the source or affiliation of a
good or service. A company or individual establishes a trademark right
by using it first in a given market. That company or individual, by virtue
of being the first user of the trademark, is deemed the senior user? A
company or individual who subsequently adopts a similar mark is termed
the junior user. Forward or direct confusion results when a consumer
mistakenly believes that the junior user's products are produced by or as-
sociated with the senior user.4 This generally occurs in cases where a jun-
ior user attempts to "pass off" their goods as those of the senior user.
Reverse confusion results when a consumer mistakenly believes that
both products are manufactured by or associated with the junior user.'
The junior user in reverse confusion is typically a larger company with
more marketing resources who saturates the market with its own product
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004; B.A., Duke Uni-
versity, 1997. The Author would like to thank everyone involved with the 2002-03 Lefkowitz Moot
Court Competition for inspiring this Note, especially her teammates and coaches; Professor Michael
Zamperini, Danny Chou, Rob Nolan, and the staff of Hastings Law Journal for their helpful sugges-
tions and edits; Ben Spero for his support and editorial advice; and her family and friends for their
support.
i. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (Ioth Cir.
1977) (providing the first explicit recognition of the reverse confusion doctrine).
2. Thad G. Long & Alfred M. Marks, Reverse Confitsion: Fundamentals and Limits, 84 TRADE-
MARK REP. 1, 4 n.7 (994).





and swamps the reputation of the senior user.6 The senior user's trade-
mark no longer serves any of its essential functions, such as designating
the source, distinguishing the product, or encapsulating the originator's
goodwill.7 The reverse confusion can destroy the senior user's ability to
control its own brand-its mark, reputation, and goodwill-and its ability
to enter new product markets, especially those in which the junior user
trades.8
In traditional direct confusion cases, the junior user adopts a similar
trademark in order to capitalize on the senior user's goodwill. This prac-
tice is termed "passing off."9 In reverse confusion, neither the junior nor
the senior user wants to capitalize on the other's goodwill.'" The junior
user in reverse confusion uses the mark not to benefit from the senior
user's goodwill (the senior user is most often lesser known), but because
the mark is a good fit with a marketing campaign." Confused consumers
who mistakenly buy the senior user's products or services may blame the
senior user for passing off, believing that the junior user was first to the
mark. 2
The senior user may benefit from the junior user's goodwill, if it
gains sales because of the confused purchases. 3 Nonetheless, any profit
attributable to confusion is evidence of the injury to the senior user: con-
sumers meant to buy the junior user's goods, and the senior user loses its
ability to distinguish its products with the mark. The confusion turns the
senior user's mark from an asset of goodwill into a liability of ill will
when customers believe the senior user passes off its products for those
of the junior user. 4 In addition, if the junior user's mark develops an un-
favorable reputation, the senior user will suffer because confused con-
sumers will associate the unfavorable reputation with the senior user's
mark.
6. Id.
7. 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03 (release 19, 2003).
8. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co., 978 F.2d at 958.
9. Long & Marks, supra note 2, at 3.
lo. Id. at 2.
i1. Id. at 27. Although the junior user's intent is not to trade off the senior user's reputation in
reverse confusion, the junior user who adopts a mark with knowledge that the similarity may cause
confusion will likely consider the senior user's reputation. If the junior user knows from the outset that
the senior mark suffers from an unfavorable reputation, the junior user may chose not to infringe for
fear that the unfavorable reputation may be attributed to the junior user by some confused customers.
12. Long & Marks, supra note 2, at 2.
13. See, e.g., A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., No. 94-cv-74o8, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 233, at "s1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2002); see also id.




In direct and reverse confusion cases, courts use varied multifactor
tests to determine whether a "likelihood of confusion" exists between the
senior and junior users' marks. Where a likelihood exists, courts must
find that the junior user has infringed.'5 District courts regularly award
injunctions when they find a likelihood of confusion, regardless of
whether the junior user infringed willfully.' 6 In cases where damage to
the plaintiff or profit to the defendant due to infringement seems slight,
an injunction alone serves as appropriate relief. 7 If an injunction will sat-
isfy the equities of the case, courts deny damages. 
8
When awarding damages, an additional issue facing the court in re-
verse confusion cases is whether the junior user willfully infringed upon
the mark. Courts have disagreed about how to identify willful infringe-
ment, and some circuits misunderstand the motivation behind reverse
confusion cases. In reverse confusion cases, the junior user typically in-
fringes because the mark fits with its own marketing plan. The junior
user wants to retain its own goodwill and use the senior user's mark to
convey that goodwill.'9 The motivation differs from direct confusion
cases, where the junior user intends to trade on the goodwill of the senior
user. Courts that look for an intent to trade on the senior user's goodwill
in reverse confusion cases fail to recognize this appreciable difference.
This Note focuses on a second problem in reverse confusion cases:
the standard for awarding damages. Courts have failed to articulate a
reasoned and consistent standard for awarding damages. Section 35(a) of
the Lanham Act, which governs monetary damages in infringement
cases, provides little guidance for courts to assess and enhance damages."
15. Id.
6. See, e.g., Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 4 F.3d 1242, 1247 (8th Cir.
1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 cmt. b (2002).
17. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947). Although decided
before Congress enacted the Lanham Act, Champion Spark Plug is often cited by courts for the
proposition that relief in a Lanham Act case should be limited to an injunction where it is sufficient to
achieve equity.
18. Id.
19. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219, 1236 (D. Colo.
1976). The court explained the motivation and harm of reverse confusion:
The logical consequence of [failing to recognize reverse confusion] would be the immuniza-
tion from unfair competition liability of a company with a well established trade name and
with the economic power to advertise extensively for a product name taken from a competi-
tor. If the law is to limit recovery to passing off, anyone with adequate size and resources
can adopt any trademark and develop a new meaning for that trademark as identification of
the second user's products.
Id.
20. Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C § 1117(a) (200o).
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Section 35(a) specifies that a monetary award and any enhancement
thereto must not constitute a penalty."
Courts face a particular challenge in assessing damages in reverse
confusion cases because the injury primarily amounts to lost control of
the senior user's mark, reputation, and goodwill," which inherently re-
quires speculation as to the dollar value of these intangibles. Despite the
difficulties in calculation, courts must find some monetary measurement
to compensate the senior user for its losses and the corresponding unjust
gain to the willful infringer.
Damages traditionally serve to compensate for wrongdoing, to deter
future wrongdoing, and to prevent unjust enrichment.23 Although courts
have shied away from compensating the senior user by putting a value on
the loss of goodwill and control of the mark, courts have also failed to
agree on whether the junior user in reverse confusion enjoys unjust en-
richment from the infringement. 4 Some courts have reasoned that the
junior user's use of the infringing trademark itself does not confer a
benefit upon the junior user. Rather, it is the selling power of the junior
user that makes the trademark profitable for the junior user.25 Thus, in
reverse confusion cases the junior user is not unjustly enriched. This con-
clusion ignores the fact that the junior user has enjoyed a license without
permission. The senior user has a legal interest in the right to exclude
others from using the mark and to decide whether and to whom to as-
sign, license, or franchise the mark. The free use of a licensable trade-
mark is unjust enrichment."
Another problem in the current patchwork of damage awards for
reverse confusion cases comes from the courts that use a purely deter-
rence-motivated rationale for damages.27 Courts generally award an in-
junction in all cases, whether the infringement was innocent or willful,
and award damages only where the junior user willfully infringed on the
21. Id.
22. See A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., No. 94-cv-74o8, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 233, at "ii, n.3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2002).
23. See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 961 (7th Cir. 1992);
Banff, Ltd. v. Colberts, Inc., 996 F.2d 33,35 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1010 (I993).
24. Compare A&H Sportswear, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233, at *16 (attributing the junior user's
success to its own strength, not use of the senior user's mark), with Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at
963 (upholding a monetary award based on the theory of unjust enrichment to the junior user).
25. A&H Sportswear, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233, at *16.
26. See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 963 (stating that the junior user enjoyed unjust
enrichment by using the senior user's mark without paying for it and a royalty award would reflect the
unjust enrichment).
27. See, e.g., Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1247 (8th Cir.
1994); Banff, 996 F.2d at 35.
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mark.2s Although deterrence is a natural by-product of any monetary
award, the Lanham Act indicates that penalizing the junior user should
not be the sole rationale for awarding or enhancing damages. 9 When
courts award or enhance damages solely for the purpose of deterrence,
the award is akin to a penalty, and the award violates Congress's express
proscription of penalty awards in Lanham Act cases.
This Note proposes that in cases of willful infringement involving re-
verse confusion, courts should use a royalty rate to determine damages,
and pair them with an injunction, as is typically awarded in cases of in-
fringement.3" Courts should also award attorneys' fees, as provided for by
the Lanham Act for cases of willful infringement.3' A "reasonable royalty
rate," for purposes of this discussion, refers to the rate upon which par-
ties would mutually settle if they willfully negotiated a royalty deal.32
Courts should enhance the reasonable royalty rate in cases of willful in-
fringement to reflect the fact that the junior user enjoys what is essen-
tially a forced license, because the senior user was not able to negotiate
the terms of the trademark use and the court cannot undo the past in-
fringement.
A royalty rate represents the unjust gain to the infringer-the value
of the use of the trademark-but avoids disgorging the junior user of
profits attributable to its own goodwill. The royalty rate correspondingly
compensates the senior user for what the license was worth, without re-
quiring the calculation of the intangible values of goodwill, reputation,
and control of one's mark.33
28. Minn. Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d at 1247.
29. Id.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35(I)(b) (1995) (stating that "injunctive relief
will ordinarily be awarded against one who is liable to another for... infringement of the other's
trademark").
31. Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § I 1 17(a), gives courts discretion to award attorneys' fees in
"exceptional" cases. Congress defined "exceptional" to mean cases involving bad faith, fraud, malice,
or willful or knowing infringement. See S. REP. No. 93-1400, at 2 (1974), reprinted in t974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1732, 7133.
32. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 86o, 869-70 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The
court explained that
[a] reasonable royalty calculation envisions and ascertains the results of a hypothetical ne-
gotiation between the patentee and the infringer at a time before the infringing activity be-
gan. Thus, the reasonable royalty calculus assesses the relevant market as it would have
developed before and absent the infringing activity. Although an exercise in approximation,
this analysis must be based on "sound economic and factual predicates." Royalties, like lost
profits, are compensatory damages, not punitive.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
33. There may be cases where the junior user's use of the mark hurts the senior user's sales be-
cause the junior user develops an unfavorable reputation. If the senior user can sufficiently show lost
earnings because of the confusion, courts should allow the senior user to collect damages based on
credible evidence, if it amounts to more than a reasonable royalty rate.
February 2004]
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Part I of this Note examines the purpose of trademark law and the
relief available under the Lanham Act. It also discusses the unique harm
of reverse confusion and why reverse confusion requires courts to fash-
ion different remedies than those involved in direct confusion. Part II
further explains the reverse confusion theory and draws examples from
case law showing how courts differ in their definition of willful infringe-
ment and assessment of relief for reverse confusion claims. Part III sug-
gests that an award of royalty-based damages, along with an injunction'
and attorneys' fees, makes willful infringement unprofitable without vio-
lating the Lanham Act's specific prohibition on penalty awards.
I. TRADEMARK LAW AND THE LANHAM ACT
Trademarks designate the source or origin of a product, symbolize a
particular standard of quality, identify a product and distinguish it from
another's products, symbolize the goodwill of the trademark owner, and
motivate consumers to purchase the product.35 They represent a substan-
tial advertising investment and protect the public from confusion and de-
ception. 6 The primary piece of trademark legislation is the Trademark
Act of 1946, commonly referred to as the Lanham Act.3 Congress recog-
nized two groups who need trademark protection, consumers and trade-38
mark owners. Trademark protection assures that consumers receive an
item from the intended originator, and that trademark owners retain the
value of the resources they commit to building their mark and associated
goodwill without others misappropriating their mark.39
If a junior user misappropriates or infringes on a senior user's
trademark, the Lanham Act allows a plaintiff to recover damages, in ad-
dition to an injunction and attorneys' fees. Although injunctions are the
primary remedy in an infringement case because of the irreparable harm
and inadequacy of monetary damages,' an injunction alone is not
enough in cases of willful infringement. An injunction fails to provide
complete relief because it only addresses future harm and fails to address
34. Courts using a royalty rate for damages could easily assess an appropriate value for a condi-
tioned injunction, which would set the price at which the junior user could buy or license the mark, if
the senior user agrees to sell. A conditioned injunction, unlike a traditional injunction, appropriately
caps the senior user's bargaining power for the sale or licensing of its mark.
35. s GILSON, supra note 7, § 1.03[I].
36. Id.
37. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000). Congressman Fritz
Lanham, after whom the Act was named, was the principal force behind the legislation.
38. S. REP. No. 1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.
39. Id.
40. See Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Comm., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 1982) (assuming ir-




the past loss and unjust gain. Even when paired with attorneys' fees, the
injunction still misses the harm caused up to the point of litigation.
In general, damages serve to compensate the plaintiff's loss, prevent
the defendant's unjust enrichment, or deter future illegal behavior.4 ' Sec-
tion 35(a) of the Lanham Act, which governs remedies for common law
and registered trademark infringement, explicitly reflects the first two
purposes. That section allows a plaintiff to recover the damages sus-
tained and/or an amount of the defendant's profits, subject to the princi-
ples of equity, as well as the costs of the action.42 Section 35(a) makes
clear that either an award of damages or profits must constitute compen-
sation and not a penalty.43 This section calls into question whether courts
should justify awards on the rationale of deterrence alone. Part I of this
Note considers whether damages or enhancements based on a deterrent
rationale equate to a penalty and concludes that damages or enhance-
ments based solely on a deterrent rationale are akin to a penalty. This
Note suggests that awards in reverse confusion should represent the costs
of a forced license, and deterrence should remain only a natural accom-
panying purpose, not a sole justification.
Section 35(a) leaves the assessment of profits and damages to the
discretion of the court, with little guidance on the rationale for award
enhancement. With a profit-based award, section 35(a) requires that the
plaintiff prove only the defendant's sales, and then the defendant may
prove claimed costs or deductions.' The resulting challenge for the court
is how much of the profit reasonably relates to the use of the trademark,
not the defendant's own goodwill.45 Section 35(a)'s guidance in this as-
sessment directs courts on when to deviate from the proven sales: "If the
court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either
inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment
41. See, e.g., W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir. 1970), and cases cited
therein.
42. 15 U.S.C. § II17(a). Section I157(a) states:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office, or a willful violation under section t 125(a) of this title, shall have been
established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, sub-
ject to the provisions of sections itiI and I 14 of this title, and subject to the principles of
equity, to recover (i) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3)
the costs of the action.
Id. A plaintiff may recover both damages and profits, although the combination must not double
count.
43. Id. ("Such sum in either of the above circumstances [an award of damages or profits] shall
constitute compensation and not a penalty.").
44. Id.
45. See A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., No. 94-cv-74o8, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 233, at *t 1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2002) (attributing the junior user's success to its own strength, not
use of the senior user's mark).
February 2004]
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for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circum-
stances of the case.
46
With a damage-based award, section 35(a) directs the court to assess
any amount up to three times the proven damages, "according to the cir-
cumstances of the case."47 Plaintiffs face a challenge in proving and quan-
tifying actual damages where the harm centers on the intangible values
of goodwill, reputation, and control of one's marki Plaintiffs in direct
confusion cases may be able to show lost sales, but plaintiffs in reverse
confusion may gain sales.49 A gain in sales due to reverse confusion
(where customers buy the senior user's goods believing them to be the
junior user's) actually evidences the harm done to the senior user: its lost
ability to distinguish its mark.
In either a profit- or damage-based calculation, the court may alter
the award according to the circumstances of the case."0 Congressional de-
bates surrounding the Lanham Act fail to clarify the circumstances that
call for an enhancement or reduction. Nonetheless, an indication of con-
gressional intent may lie in the difference in treatment between profit
and damages awards-courts may increase or decrease profits, but only
increase damages, for award amounts.
The profits that a senior user attributes to confused sales may over-
state the harm in direct and reverse confusion cases. Profits are easier to
prove than damages: A plaintiff can easily quantify the profits of the jun-
ior user, but cannot easily evidence the damage to its own mark, good-
will, and reputation. But although profits are easy to prove, they are not
necessarily an accurate reflection of the harm. In a classic direct confu-
sion case, not every sale to a junior user represents a diverted sale; there-
fore, the junior user's profits do not absolutely or proportionately reflect
the harm. In reverse confusion cases, the profits made by the senior user
as a result of the confusion reflect the selling power of the junior user,
not the value of the trademark or the senior user's goodwill associated
with the mark. Again, the profits fail to reflect the harm. Congress
drafted and enacted section 35(a) before courts recognized the reverse
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
47- Id.
48. See A&H Sportswear, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233, at *1i (noting that the plaintiff failed to
evidence pecuniary damage, while acknowledging the plaintiff's lost control over its name, quality,
products, and reputation in the marketplace).
49. See id. at 1642 (noting "the lack of any lost sales, lost profits, or any other actual damage to
Plaintiffs; and [] the possibility that Plaintiffs might have actually gained business as a result of the re-
verse confusion"). There may be cases where the junior user's use of the mark hurts the senior user's
sales because the junior user develops an unfavorable reputation. In these cases, the senior user faces a
difficult challenge in proving lost sales due to the confusion (as is true in direct confusion cases).
50. 15 U.S.C. § III7(a).
[Vol. 55:737
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confusion theory, but the disconnection between profits and the harm in
reverse confusion cases is even greater and more applicable than in di-
rect confusion cases, which the statute was meant to address.'
By comparison, proven damages often underestimate the extent of
harm because the senior user cannot adequately quantify and prove the
lost goodwill and lost control of the mark. In passing off cases, the plain-
tiff faces the challenge of proving the amount of diverted sales due to the
infringement. In reverse confusion cases, the best proof of the damage,
the inability to distinguish one's mark, comes from confused sales. But
rather than viewing the confused sales as a loss, courts may view them as
a benefit to the senior user. This view undermines the decision to recog-
nize reverse confusion because the confused sales indicate the extent to
which the senior user cannot control its own mark. The statutory allow-
ance for enhanced damages reflects that Congress recognized the diffi-
culty senior users would have in proving damages. Proving damages is
even more difficult in the reverse confusion context, and thus, the need
for enhanced damages is even greater.
Courts may enhance or reduce an award, depending on the extent to
which the proven harm likely mirrors the actual harm. Congress recog-
nized that proven profits may over- or underestimate the harm and al-
lowed for enhancement or reduction of proven profits. In contrast,
proven damages consistently underestimate the harm, and Congress al-
lowed only for enhancement of proven damages. Congress allowed for
enhancements primarily to help cure inexactitude in measuring relief, not
solely to deter infringement.
The conclusion that enhanced damage-based awards go to the inabil-
ity to measure full damages and not to deter willful infringement garners
support from the Senate report explaining the attorneys' fees provision.
Congressional notes explain the "exceptional" cases in which courts may
award reasonable attorneys' fees for a Lanham Act violation. 3 Excep-
tional cases involve malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful behavior
by one of the parties. 4 Congress added the attorneys' fees provision
more than thirty years after the Lanham Act took effect in response to
the Supreme Court's unwillingness to award attorneys' fees for deliber-
51. Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946, and the first explicit recognition of the reverse
confusion doctrine came in 1977, with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Big 0 Tire
Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 56I F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (Ioth Cir. 1977).
52. See A&H Sportswear, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233, at *it.
53. 15 U.S.C. § I17(a) ("The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party."); S. REP. No. 93-1400, at 10974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7132.
54. S. REP. No. 93-14oo, at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7133.
February 2004]
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ate trademark infringement where the Act did not specifically provide
for them.5
The congressional report notes that attorneys' fees encourage
trademark owners to enforce their rights and thereby help prevent pur-
chaser confusion. They also serve as a penalty, discouraging "deliberate
and flagrant infringement.",6 The report also notes that section 35(a) al-
lows for treble damages where such an enhancement encourages the en-
forcement of trademark rights. 7 Frequently, where the plaintiff promptly
brings an action against flagrant infringement, the plaintiff is only able to
show a nominal amount of damages." A trebling of damages accounts for
the intangible harms not accounted for by the nominal damages and
makes it worthwhile for the plaintiff to bring suit. Treble damages are
meant to compensate, assuring trademark owners that despite their in-
ability to prove actual damages in line with their loss, courts will consider
enhancing the award to reflect incalculable but real injuries and make
the investment for trademark defense worthwhile.
By comparison, Congress decided that treble damages should auto-
matically follow in counterfeit cases59 explicitly to serve as a deterrent.
Section 35(b) of the Lanham Act applies only to counterfeit trademark
infringement cases and orders three times proven profits or damages,
whichever amounts to more, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances in favor of the defendanti ° The Senate report accompanying the
enactment of section 35(b) explains that for every counterfeiter brought
to court, many counterfeiters evade punishment, and treble damages
serve a general deterrent purpose.
The Senate committee recognized the uniqueness of counterfeit
cases covered by section 35(b), and limited the need for automatic treble
damages only to those cases. Although the Senate committee recognized
the general Lanham Act policy against penalty awards, it argued that
treble damages were necessary to take the profit out of counterfeiting
and serve as a "potent deterrent.
62
It is unclear when an award's value as a deterrent makes the award a
penalty. The Supreme Court recognizes that the "very idea of treble
55. Id. at 5; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,721 (1967).
56. S. REP. No. 93-i4oo, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7136.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. In a counterfeit case, the junior user "produc[es] or sell[s] a product with a sham trademark
that is an intentional and calculated reproduction of the genuine trademark." 4 MCCARTHY, supra note
14, § 25:10.
6o. Lanham Act § 35(b), i5 U.S.C. § II17(b) (2000).




damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful
conduct, ' '6' and other courts reflect that notion in their decisions. 64 Also,
the Supreme Court describes deterrence as a traditional goal of punish-
ment.6' American Law Reports describes statutory enhancements of
proven damages as punitive damages.6 Every award of damages serves a
deterrent rationale, but when a court assesses damages based solely on a
justification of deterrence, the award is akin to a penalty. Given that
Congress allows for treble damages under section 35(a), but prohibits
penalty awards, Congress must intend for an award justification based on
more than deterrence alone.
In deciding infringement awards, some courts repeat the Lanham
Act prohibition on penalties but then justify their awards with a deter-
rence rationale.(' Although neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
spoken on the role of deterrence in awarding or enhancing damages un-
der the Lanham Act, the plain language of the Act, combined with the
common definition of deterrence, weighs against damages or an en-
hancement supported only by the need for deterrence.
Section 35(a) of the Lanham Act discusses only damage- or profit-
based calculations. Nonetheless, a royalty rate-based award would not be
inconsistent with the statute, because it would represent both the damage
to the senior user-the lost licensing revenue for use of the mark-and
the profit to the junior user-the free use of the mark. If courts were
consistently to use a royalty rate method, they could discourage willful
reverse confusion without disregarding the Lanham Act's intent to base a
monetary award on the need to correct the harm, not to punish infring-
ers.
II. THE REVERSE CONFUSION THEORY AND RELIEF GRANTED
The first court case to recognize reverse confusion as an actionable
theor7 was Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. in
1977. Since the seminal Big 0 Tire decision, every circuit that has con-
sidered reverse confusion recognizes it as a form of trademark infringe-
63. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 63 o , 639 (1981).
64. See, e.g., Wilson v. Union Tool Co., 275 F. 624, 631 (S.D. Cal. 1921); Va. Panel Corp. v. Mac
Panel Co., 887 F. Supp. 88o, 884-85 (W.D. Va. 1995).
65. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329 (1998).
66. V. Woerner, Punitive or Exemplary Damages as Recoverable for Trademark Infringement or
Unfair Competition, 47 A.L.R.2d 117, § 1 (1956).
67. See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1352-53 (7th Cir.
1994).
68. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (Ioth Cir. 1977 ) .
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ment.6 Although courts have grown more comfortable with the reverse
confusion cause of action, not one has articulated an appropriate stan-
dard for fashioning a complete remedy under the Lanham Act.
At the time of the decision, section 35(a) remedies did not clearly
apply to common law trademarks,7' and the district court used state law
to guide the remedies decision. The jury awarded compensatory damages
for corrective advertising, plus six times the compensatory damages as
punitive damages.7' The Tenth Circuit reduced the compensatory dam-
ages but maintained the six-to-one punitive damages ratio.72 After the
1988 Trademark Law Revision Act, courts have applied section 35(a) to
both registered and unregistered trademarks. Section 35(a) prohibits pu-
nitive damages such as those found in Big 0 Tire, and, because the Big 0
Tire award was based on corrective advertising and punitive damages
only, the decision set an example for finding reverse confusion but not
for assessing damages. 3
Almost all the circuits have developed a test by which to evaluate a
reverse confusion claim, based on the test traditionally used to find liabil-
ity in direct confusion cases.74 A plaintiff who establishes senior status in
the relevant market and claims reverse confusion must show that a "like-
lihood of confusion" exists among the relevant class of customers.75 Cir-
cuit courts approach a likelihood of confusion analysis with different
multifactor tests. Courts commonly consider a combination of the follow-
ing factors: (i) the degree of similarity between the senior and junior us-
ers' marks; (2) the comparative strength of the marks; (3) the price of the
goods and other factors that indicate the care and attention expected of
purchasers; (4) the length of time the junior user used the mark without
evidence of actual confusion arising; (5) the junior user's intent in adopt-
69. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:io n.4 (detailing reverse confusion cases in each circuit
that has considered the issue).
70. Id.
71. Big 0 Tire Dealers, 561 F.2d at 1374-75.
72. Id. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals likely applied state law remedies because before the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 ("TLRA"), the applicability of section 35(a) remedies to cases
involving unregistered trademark violations (such as the Big 0 violation) was unclear. William G.
Barber, Recovery of Profits Under the Lanham Act: Are the District Courts Doing Their Job, 82
TRADEMARK REP. 141 , 143 (1992).
73. A corrective advertising award gives the senior user a portion of the advertising budget that
the junior user spent on promoting the infringing mark. An award of damages based on corrective ad-
vertising fails to adequately redress willful infringement because it inappropriately places the burden
on the senior user to correct customer confusion. See, e.g., A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret
Stores, Inc., No. 94-cv-74o8, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233, at *25 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2002) (refusing to
order the senior mark holder to use a disclaimer for corrective advertising purposes because "such an
order would place the burden of preventing the confusion on the wronged, not the wrongdoer").
74. Long & Marks, supra note 2, at 3-4.
75. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947,957 (7th Cir. 1992).
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ing the mark; (6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) whether the goods are
marketed through the same channels of trade and advertised through the
same media; (8) the extent to which the users' marketing targets are the
same; (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers be-
cause of the similarity of function; and (io) other facts suggesting that the
consuming public might expect the senior user to manufacture both
products or expand into the junior or other user's market.76
In direct confusion cases, the circuit courts almost uniformly hold
that a finding of the defendant's willful infringement or bad faith justifies
an award of profits.' The United States Supreme Court held in Cham-
pion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders in 1947 that the intent of an infringer
bears on the issue of whether and in what amount to award damages. 78
Courts look to whether the infringement was willful or in bad faith to de-
termine the amount of damages that appropriately redresses the inequi-
ties of the case. 9 Courts differ in their definition of willful infringement
and the degree to which it bears on an award."'
Consistency in reverse confusion awards depends upon consistency
in defining willfulness. In order to appropriately define willfulness for the
purposes of reverse confusion, courts must recognize the motivation be-
hind a junior user's decision to infringe. The junior user in reverse confu-
sion enjoys a better-known brand and uses the mark because it fits well
with the branding plan, not because the junior user wants to benefit from
the senior user's goodwill." This motivation differs from a passing off
case, where the junior user adopts the mark to trade on the senior user's
goodwill. 82 Any definition that involves the intent to deceive consumers
or enjoy the goodwill of the senior user fails to fit with the reverse confu-
sion doctrine. Generally, courts should find willfulness where a junior
user infringes on a senior user's mark without a reasonable belief that the
use was lawful."
76. See, e.g., A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir.
2000). See also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §§ 24:30-:43 (summarizing the varied tests used by the cir-
cuit courts).
77. Barber, supra note 72, at 145.
78. 331 U.S. 125, 131-32 (1947).
79. Barber, supra note 72, at 145.
8o. Long & Marks, supra note 2, at 27.
81. Id.
82. LOUIs ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 22:10
(4th ed. 2003).
83. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. e (995); Big 0 Tire Deal-
ers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219, 1239 (D. Colo. 1976); Sands, Taylor &
Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 961 (7th Cir. 1992); Securacomm Consulting Inc. v. Secu-
racom Inc., 166 F.3 d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1999).
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Although most courts reserve damages for cases of willful infringe-
ment, damages do not automatically follow."4 The inconsistent awards in
reverse confusion cases reflect a general failure to account for the harms
caused, rather than a calculated consideration of the unique equities pre-
sented in each case. In some instances, courts fail to properly define will-
ful infringement in the reverse confusion context, as discussed above.
Whether or not courts have properly defined willful infringement, they
have also failed to properly justify the relief awarded. An examination of
two notable reverse confusion cases indicates the rationale that courts
use either to justify or deny monetary damages in cases of willful in-
fringement.
The protracted litigation of A&H Sportswear v. Victoria's Secret
traces the Third Circuit's recognition of the reverse confusion doctrine
and its ensuing struggle to appreciate the harm from reverse confusion.
The plaintiff, A&H Sportswear, registered the trademark Miraclesuit in
1992 for its swimsuits that create a slimming effect.86 A&H manufactured
about ten percent of the swimsuits made in the United States."7 Victoria's
Secret started to sell women's lingerie under the name Miracle Bra in
1993 and registered the mark for lingerie in 1994. 8' Also in 1994, Victo-
ria's Secret introduced the Miracle Bra swimsuit, which created confu-
sion between the two companies' swimwear.
89
In its first bench trial, the district court found that, regarding swim-
wear, there was a possibility, but not a likelihood, of confusion, and ruled
that Victoria's Secret could use its Miracle Bra mark with swimwear only
if it used a disclaimer and paid A&H a reasonable royalty.' On appeal,
the Third Circuit, en banc, held that likelihood of confusion, not possibil-
ity of confusion, was the correct standard, remanded for a likelihood de-
termination, and reversed the damages award.9' On remand, the district
court found no likelihood of confusion, and thus, no grounds for reverse
confusion.92 The parties both appealed, and the Third Circuit articulated
a revised standard for likelihood of confusion in cases where the goods
84. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131-32 (1947) (proposing that relief is
limited to an injunction in infringement cases where an injunction satisfies the equities involved); Wil-
liamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 251 F.2d 924, 927 (3 d Cir. 1958).
85. A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., No. 94-cv-74o8, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
233, at * 1-*6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2002) (detailing the seven-year litigation history).





90. A&H Sportswear, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233, at *2.
9 I. Id. at *2-*3.
92. Id. at *3.
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are directly competing, then remanded for fact-finding in accordance
with the new standard.93 Applying the new test, the district court found
that Victoria's Secret's Miracle Bra mark, when used to sell swimsuits,
created a likelihood of confusion, and therefore infringed on A&H's
Miraclesuit mark.9' Finding that Victoria's Secret innocently infringed,
the district court granted an injunction on use of the name Miracle Bra in
conjunction with swimwear, but denied A&H any monetary relief.95
To begin, the district court used an inappropriate standard to deter-
mine whether the junior user's infringement was innocent. The court de-
fined the willfulness question as "whether the junior user intended to
usurp the goodwill of the senior user by deliberately seeking to cause
consumer confusion and thereby destroy [the] senior user's business
identity. '"" This definition misses the basic goal of recognizing reverse
confusion, which is to keep well-established trade names with the eco-
nomic power to swamp a lesser-known senior user from usurping a desir-
able trademark.' The point is that the junior user wants to use the name
because it fits with its brand, not that the junior user wants to interfere
with the business of the senior user. If courts are willing to recognize re-
verse confusion, they must adopt a standard that reflects the motivation
of infringing junior users.
Regardless of whether the district court correctly found an absence
of willfulness or bad faith, the dicta indicate the district court's, and the
Third Circuit's, discomfort with remedying any reverse confusion case,
even those in which it finds willful infringement. The court listed six rea-
sons why an award of damages would be inequitable." The first three fo-
cused on the innocent infringement finding of the court." The last three
addressed the harm, if any, caused by the infringement: A&H's increased
profits on its Miraclesuit swimwear throughout the period of infringe-
ment; A&H's failure to show lost sales or profits, or other damage; and
A&H's potential increase in sales attributable to the confusion7" The
court's reasons for denying monetary relief indicate that the court ac-
93. Id. at *3-*4. Prior to this decision, the Third Circuit cases lacked uniformity in their evalua-
tion of likelihood of confusion involving directly competing goods; the established likelihood-of-
confusion standard applied only to noncompeting goods. A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret
Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 2t1 (3d Cir. 2ooo).
94. A&H Sportswear, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233, at *4-*6.
95- Id.
96. A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 770, 793 (E.D. Pa.
2001).
97. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219, 5236 (D. Colo.
1976).





knowledged the reverse confusion doctrine, but failed to understand the
infringing party's motivation or the harm caused by infringement.
The court suggested three potential ways to calculate damages, but
rejected all of them. First, the court discussed royalty payments for past
and future infringement.0 ' The Third Circuit reversed the district court's
initial award of royalty payments for two reasons: a royalty for future use
of the mark imposed a license that neither party requested or negotiated,
and royalty awards for previous infringement are typically used in patent
and trade secret cases, not trademark cases.' The district court adopted
this rationale and denied royalty payments. 3
Second, looking at Victoria's Secret's profits, the district court noted
that its swimwear profits did not relate to the value of A&H's mark, and
used that point as another reason not to award damages.0 4 The court
found an award of profits inappropriate because Victoria's Secret's suc-
cess with the infringing Miracle Bra swimwear line reflected Victoria's
Secret's own selling power, not the strength of A&H's mark or the con-
fusion created."'° Although the court correctly concluded that Victoria's
Secret's profits should not be used as a measure of the harm caused by
infringement, the conclusion does not mean that Victoria's Secret's bene-
fit, or A&H's loss, was either inappreciable or incalculable.
Third, the court found that A&H did not suffer any pecuniary loss
due to the infringement and may even have gained sales because con-
fused customers intended to buy Victoria's Secret's suit but took home
A&H's suit.""° The court's analysis fails to recognize that A&H lost its
ability to distinguish its mark from Victoria's Secret's mark, and the
monetary benefit from the confused sales does not redress that harm.
The profits resulting from confusion evidence the extent to which Victo-
ria's Secret overwhelmed A&H's mark and hampered A&H's ability to
differentiate its product. The confused sales go to both of the Lanham
Act's concerns: customers confused the origin of A&H's swimsuits, and
A&H lost its brand identity. To offset A&H's potential for relief with the
revenue gained from confused sales-the very money that reflects loss of
brand identity-undercuts the decision of courts to recognize reverse
confusion claims in the first place.
By comparison, the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the reverse con-
fusion doctrine shows the court's appreciation of the harm to the senior
ioi. Id. at *9-*io.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *io.
104. Id. at *i5-*i6.
1O5 . Id. at *16.
io6. Id. at *17.
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user and the need to compensate that harm. In Sands, Taylor & Wood
Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., the senior user held the rights to the registered
trademark Thirst-Aid. The previous mark holder had used the mark on a
wide variety of beverages and a third party had licensed the mark at an-
other time for use in conjunction with soft drinks.'" The junior user,
Quaker, kicked off a major marketing campaign, using "Thirst Aid" as a
description of its Gatorade isotonic beverage product: "Gatorade is
Thirst Aid for That Deep Down Body Thirst.""' 8
When the senior user saw the first "Gatorade is Thirst Aid" com-
mercial, it contacted Quaker and claimed trademark infringement. 
°
Litigation ensued."' The district court held that Quaker willfully in-
fringed on the senior user's trademark and awarded ten percent of
Quaker's Gatorade profits for the period during which Quaker used
Thirst Aid in advertising. The court also awarded attorneys' fees."' The
court of appeals upheld the appropriateness of a monetary award, but
remanded on the amount, instructing the district court to explain the ten
percent award and its relation to the unjust benefit Quaker enjoyed from
use of the trademark, as compared to the amount attributable to
Quaker's own selling power."'
The court of appeals suggested that a reasonable royalty most accu-
rately reflected the benefit of use of the mark."3 Unlike the A&H
Sportswear case, the senior user in Sands, Taylor & Wood had at one
time negotiated licensing of the trademark, and the court felt comfort-
able using that royalty rate as a basis for assessing the value of the use of
the mark."4 Although the decision of the court of appeals in Sands, Tay-
lor & Wood validates the use of a royalty-based award to compensate the
senior user, it wrongly suggests that an enhancement of the reasonable
royalty rate may be necessary for deterrence."5 A better rationale for the
enhancement is that the original royalty rate represents what the senior
user willingly negotiated with a third party. Thus, an award for infringe-
ment should reflect the value of the forced license imposed because of
the infringement, which will be more than the reasonable rate settled
upon by willing parties.
107. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947,949-50 (7th Cir. 1992).
lo8. Id. at 950.
to9. Id. at 95o-51.
iso. Id.
iii. Id. at 95.
112. Id. at 963.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 950.
115. Id. at 963 n.19.
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III. ROYALTY-BASED DAMAGES RIGHT THE WRONG
The Lanham Act allows recovery through the profits of the defen-
dant and/or the damages to the plaintiff."' Traditional measurement of
either damages or profits fails in cases of reverse confusion. The damage
to a senior user in a reverse confusion case is loss of control of its mark,
reputation, and goodwill."7 The intangible nature of goodwill and reputa-
tion make them hard to measure or compensate fully." 8 In direct confu-
sion cases, courts can measure damages by the loss of profits due to any
sales diverted by the junior user."9 In reverse confusion cases, lost sales
are not at issue. A &H Sportswear shows that, if anything, the senior user
has gained sales because confused customers bought the senior user's
product thinking it originated from the better-known junior user.'
Where measuring damages based on lost goodwill or lost sales in re-
verse confusion cases is inappropriate, measuring damages based on a
share of the junior infringer's profits is also inappropriate because the
profits reflect not the value of the trademark itself, but the goodwill of
the junior user. Therefore, basing the award on the junior user's profits
misses the mark.
A royalty-based award takes into account the junior user's profits,
but focuses on the senior user's loss because it represents what the plain-
tiff should have received for use of the mark. It acknowledges a calcula-
ble part of the senior user's loss without trying to calculate the other
losses, such as control of one's mark, reputation, and goodwill. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, in remanding A&H Sportswear v. Victoria's
Secret, discouraged the district court's initial award of a royalty for past
infringement because most royalty awards arise in patent and trade se-
cret cases or where a licensing party's use of a trademark turns into in-
fringement."' The Seventh Circuit in Sands, Taylor & Wood approved a
generous approximation of royalties as a measure of the junior user's un-
just enrichment, as well as the senior user's infringed-upon trademark
rights.'" Although the history of licensing in Sands, Taylor & Wood pro-
vided the court with a reliable measure for a reasonable royalty rate,
116. 15 U.S.C. § II17(a) (2000).
117. Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 81i F.2d 96o, 9 64 (6th Cir. 1987).
118. Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F. 3 d 12, 19 (ist Cir. 1996).
119. James Koelemay, A Practical Guide to Monetary Relief in Trademark Infringement Cases, 85
TRADEMARK REP. 263, 281 (1995).
120. See, e.g., A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., No. 94-cv-74o8, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 233, at *19-*2o (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2002) (noting "the lack of any lost sales, lost profits, or
any other actual damage to Plaintiffs; and ... the possibility that Plaintiffs might have actually gained
business as a result of the reverse confusion").
121. Id. at *Io.
122. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947,963 (7th Cir. 1992).
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courts should not decline to use a royalty rate in cases, such as A&H
Sportswear, where there is no history of a license.
Finding a reasonable royalty is not a new issues for courts. The statu-
tory relief for patent infringement, codified at 35 U.S.C § 284, allows for
royalty rates.2 3 Section 284 instructs courts to award damages that ade-
quately compensate for the infringement, which should be no less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer."'
To determine the royalty rate, the court may receive expert testimony. 125
Although § 284 addresses the patent context, the idea that an infringed
party's damages are assessable according to a royalty rate works in the
trademark context as well.
Section 284 also allows the court to treble damages in cases of patent
infringement. I"6 If courts use a royalty rate in trademark infringement
cases to compensate the senior user (or, alternatively, make the junior
user pay for use of the mark) they must enhance the reasonable rate.
Without an enhancement, the royalty rate only equals the price upon
which willing parties would settle and it forces the senior user into a li-
cense deal it never intended.
The need for royalty enhancement received notice in Sands, Taylor
& Wood with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals advocating a "gener-
ous approximation" of a royalty rate.'1 Judges Cudahy and Ripple
agreed that the district court should use a reasonable royalty as a "base-
line....2 The judges seemed to base the need for enhancement on a deter-
rence theory.'29 A better enhancement justification, more in line with the
Lanham Act prohibition on penalties, focuses on the fact that a reason-
able royalty rate undervalues the forced license. A reasonable royalty
does not suit a situation in which the senior user does not want to sell the
use of its mark to the junior user.'3 ° Especially in cases where the parties
directly compete, the senior user would place a higher value on licensing
its mark than it would in cases of willing negotiations with a non-
competitor. Enhancements account for the forced nature of the license.
Under the Lanham Act, an appropriate rationale for enhancements
is compensation for the senior user's loss; it is not appropriate to justify




127. Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 963.
128. Id. at n.i9.
129. Id. (expressing Judges Cudahay and Ripple's agreement that the district court should use a
reasonable royalty as a baseline and "take into account the possible need for deterrence").




enhancements solely for deterrence purposes. Enhancements properly
justified still promote deterrence. If courts consistently award a reason-
able royalty for willful infringement, the junior user is not deterred.'3 '
The junior user can try to negotiate for use of the mark; if the senior user
refuses, the junior user knows that, at worst, it only faces paying a rea-
sonable royalty rate, equal to what it would have paid in a negotiated li-
cense. In essence, the court condones the infringement by assessing what
willing parties would have struck in negotiations.'32 The enhancement can
deter and compensate, but should be justified primarily as compensation,
not deterrence.
CONCLUSION
An enhanced royalty rate award best addresses the unjust enrich-
ment in a case of willful, reverse confusion. Comparatively, other remedy
measures available under the Lanham Act prove inappropriate. An as-
sessment of profits in reverse confusion cases reflects the selling power of
the junior user, not the gain to the infringer or the loss to the infringed.
An assessment of damages requires the plaintiff to prove intangibles such
as the loss of control of its mark, reputation, and goodwill, which sets the
burden of proof too high to effectively address reverse confusion.
Although injunctions are the primary remedy in an infringement
case because of the irreparable harm and inadequacy of monetary dam-
ages alone,'33 an injunction alone is not enough in cases of willful in-
fringement. An injunction fails to provide complete relief because it only
addresses future harm and fails to address the past loss and unjust gain.
Even when paired with attorneys' fees, the injunction still misses the
harm caused up to the point of litigation.
Congress allows enhanced damages only because it recognizes the
inexactitude of measuring damages in infringement cases and that the
amounts arrived at by courts will often under-compensate the trademark
holder. A reasonable royalty rate, which reflects the amount upon which
willing parties would settle, needs enhancement to reflect the un-
negotiated license forced upon the senior user.
131. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978) (deciding
what constitutes a reasonable royalty in the context of patent infringement).
132. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (revers-
ing an award of a reasonable royalty in favor of an accounting of profits because the reasonable roy-
alty failed to make willful infringement unprofitable).
133. See Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Comm., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 1982) (assuming ir-
reparable harm, an inadequacy of damages, and a balance of equities in favor of the plaintiff where
trademark infringement occurred).
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Courts must focus on the appropriate rationale for monetary relief,
and they should recognize that properly justified awards still deter willful
infringement. If courts fail to appropriately award infringed-upon senior
trademark holders, companies with enough resources can adopt any de-
sirable trademark as their own with little consequence. On the other
hand, overly generous reverse confusion awards also present a problem.
If awards represent windfalls to the senior user, rather than just compen-
sation, junior users looking to extend their own mark may stay out of
new markets because of a chilling effect from the windfall awards. The
amount of the enhancement awarded by a court should reflect the need
to compensate, and not the desire to deter. An enhanced royalty rate,
with a conditioned injunction and attorneys' fees, prevents unjust en-
richment in willful infringement cases without serving as a chilling pen-
alty.
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